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Abstract: Using examples drawn from the archives of the British Musicians’ Union (MU), this article 
examines the role of the representatives of musical labour in shaping copyright legislation in the UK. 
Arguing that this has rarely been acknowledged in the narrative surrounding music copyright, it seeks 
to show how the recording industry and the MU have worked together to protect very different interests. 
It notes, however, that this has often resulted in conflict within the union, as it battled to preserve a 
collectivist philosophy in the face of both internal and external pressures.
Résumé: À partir d’exemples tirés des archives du Syndicat des musiciens britanniques (Musicians Union, 
MU), cet article examine le rôle des représentants du travail musical dans la formulation de la législation 
sur les droits d’auteur au Royaume-Uni. Argumentant le fait que cela a été rarement reconnu dans les 
récits entourant les droits d’auteurs de musique, j’essaie de montrer comment l’industrie du disque et le 
MU ont travaillé ensemble à protéger des intérêts très différents, tout en remarquant, cependant, que cela 
a souvent résulté en des conflits avec le syndicat, tandis que celui-ci luttait pour la préservation d’une 
philosophie collectiviste tout en étant soumis à des pressions à la fois internes et externes.
Since the publication of Frith’s groundbreaking article, “Copyright and the Music Business” (1987), accounts of the music industries1 have 
increasingly explained their operation in terms of the acquisition and 
exploitation of intellectual property rights (See, for example Frith 1993; 
Frith and Marshall 2004; and Wikströr 2009) However, in unraveling the 
complex series of relationships between music corporations, their collection 
agencies and the law, the role of those who performed the music, and the 
work of their representatives, is largely neglected. Using material drawn 
from the archives of the British Musicians’ Union (MU), this article aims 
to redress this imbalance by looking at the evolution of copyright in sound 
recordings in the UK from the perspective of musical labour.
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The research stems from a wider research project on the history of 
the MU,2 and my colleague, Martin Cloonan, details the background of both 
this and the opportunities presented by our approach (viewing musicians as 
workers) in his article elsewhere in this issue (2014: 10-29). More pertinent 
here is how this research and approach sheds new light on matters relating to 
copyright from the perspective of musical labour. Central to this is the Union’s 
archive,3 which contains documents previously unavailable to researchers on 
copyright matters and that adds considerable detail to our understanding of 
how the copyright regime in the UK has developed through the 20th century. 
In addition, the nature of the Union’s interactions with copyright reflect the 
interests of the players and workers4 in the music profession, rather than 
authors, creators and composers who have been the focal point of most 
previous studies of copyright and the music industries (See, for example, the 
various accounts in Frith and Marshall 2004).
This article aims to shift this focus and does so in four parts. The first 
offers some context for the importance of copyright in the music industries. The 
second explains the origins of copyright in recorded sound in the UK before 
looking at five major instances where the MU has been involved in significant 
changes to the copyright regime. The third part looks specifically at the impact 
of these changes on the internal machinations of the Union, and how they caused 
conflict between different types of working musicians. Finally, this paper teases 
out the wider implications of these copyright debates for those involved in 
organizing musical labour in the current industrial and political context. 
Using this approach, the article will claim that: 
(i)	 Far from being a recent phenomenon, the never-ending acquisition, 
extension and promulgation of rights surrounding recorded music has 
been the key to the exploitation of musical labour throughout the entire 
history of the recording industry, and 
(ii)	 That the conflict within the recording industry, described by Negus as a 
series of “tensions between artists, consumers and entertainment cor-
porations” (1992: vi) is better understood by also considering instances 
of cooperation between supposedly conflicted parties and the internal 
tensions within each. 
In doing so, it will show how the MU has frequently found itself on 
the same side of copyright campaigns as the record companies, cooperating 
with their trade bodies in attempts to extend and maximize the benefits for 
both parties. For the Union, benefits centred on protecting employment; for 
the record companies, their motivation was a more straightforward pursuit 
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of profit. While this mixture of shared interests and common enemies 
(frequently broadcasters5) has preserved generally good industrial relations 
across the British recording industry for most of its history, it has, on occasion, 
destabilized the Union, leaving it to deal with internecine quarrelling over the 
proceeds of its negotiations. 
Part 1: Music as a Copyright Industry
Before looking in detail at these claims, it is useful to note the substantial change 
in how the mechanics of the recording industry have been explained by those 
with an academic interest in it. Early accounts by the likes of Hirsch (1969, 
1972) and Peterson and Berger (1975) were heavily influenced by what Jones 
describes as the “gloomy weight of Adorno’s work” (2012: 2), wherein the 
“culture industry” and the processes within it were described with reference to 
“assembly lines” (1979 [1944]: 163) that operated a “synthetic, planned method 
of turning out its products” (163).
Frith challenged this conceptualization of recording as a manufacturing 
industry when he claimed, in 1987, that for record companies “the age of 
manufacture is now over. Companies (and company profits) are no longer 
organized around making things, but depend on the creation of rights” (1987: 57). 
Negus subsequently argues that the recording industry bore “only a superficial 
resemblance to a production line” (1992: 46) and, influenced by work on the 
cultural industries by Miège (1989) and Hesmondhalgh (2002), more recent 
accounts have gone as far as to suggest that “the contemporary music industry is 
best understood as a ‘copyright industry’” (Wikström: 2009: 12). 
The definition of what constitutes “the music industry” or “music 
industries” (see Williamson and Cloonan 2007, 2013 and Jones 2012)6 and 
the extent to which copyright is the best way of understanding them remain 
unresolved and beyond the scope of this article, but the point is that copyright is 
now integral to the business strategies of all of the major (and most of the minor) 
firms operating in the contemporary music industries.7
Part 2: Key Moments in the Development of UK Copyright in 
Sound Recordings
The story here, however, is not about the global music industries or copyright 
regimes. Instead, it will focus on the initial recognition of copyright in sound 
recordings in the UK’s Copyright Act (1911) and discuss five of the most 
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important changes to it and the role of the MU in bringing them about. These 
are: the recognition of rights in public performance; the agreement between 
Phonographic Performance Ltd. (PPL)8 and the Musicians’ Union to manage 
and control these new rights in 1946; the gradual lobbying for, and recognition 
of, performers’ rights; the Monopolies and Mergers Commission report into 
Collective Licensing (1988); and the recent9 extension of the copyright term 
length from fifty to seventy years.  
(a) The Recognition of Copyright in Sound Recordings 1911
To recognize the significance of the rights granted by the 1911 Copyright Act, 
it is important to understand the position of both the record companies and 
the musicians in the period immediately before it. The recording industry in 
Britain was then undergoing its first existential crisis due to a downturn in 
the economy. Between 1907 and 1909, the biggest British record company, 
Columbia, went from being “a prosperous and secure business with substantial 
record catalogues in the twin formats of cylinder and disc” (Martland 1996: 
102) to having to close all its retail branches and dismiss the majority of its 
employees just two years later.
This undoubtedly influenced Columbia’s thinking on the issue of 
public performance of their records. Rather than seeing these performances 
as an opportunity to generate new income, they viewed them as a means of 
promoting the sales of the disc. The submission of the Gramophone Company 
to the Copyright Committee in 1909 noted that “public performances (of 
records) in our view are a great advertisement to the music, and the author 
would be very sorry for us to discontinue them” (qtd. in Board of Trade 1952: 
50). When Lord Gorrell asked specifically whether “the purchaser of a disc 
should not merely acquire the right to use it in his own private surroundings like 
the singing of a song, but to use it in public?” the response of the Gramophone 
Company was simply “yes” (50). Therefore, the record companies’ position 
in 1909 was that purchasing a recording allowed the consumer to play it in 
public, and that this would benefit sales of the recording.
These deliberations, however, had little impact on musicians. Most working 
musicians were in symphony orchestras, or more likely, playing in theatre and 
cinema orchestras. Few, if any, of the Amalgamated Musicians Union’s10 members 
had ever been involved in a recording session as most of those who performed on 
records at the time—opera stars, concert stars and music hall performers—were 
either in other unions,11 or were not unionized. Therefore, working musicians 
had little interest in the implications of investing copyright in sound recordings 
because, at that stage, it had no impact on their work.
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(b) Carwardine and Phonographic Performance Ltd.
The first significant change to the practice (if not the wording) of UK copyright 
law with regards to sound recordings came after a Bristol restaurant owner, 
Stephen Carwardine, played a recording of Auber’s Overture: The Black Domino 
in his establishment during February 1933. Wanting to test the legislation on 
public performance rights, The Gramophone Company, who had released 
the record, brought an action against Carwardine12 for infringement of their 
performing right in the record. The judge ruled that the rights assigned to 
the record companies in the Copyright Act (1911) went beyond merely 
protecting against mechanical reproduction of the work, but also gave them 
“the sole right to use that record for a performance in public” (McFarlane 
1980: 132). Though this was not reflected in statute until 1956, EMI and 
Decca13 immediately formed Phonographic Performance Ltd. (PPL) in order 
to exploit what Frith and Marshall called “a new kind of musical copyright” 
(2004: 8) and the company immediately began negotiating licences with music 
users. 
The context is as important as the implications of the ruling. For both 
record companies and musicians involved in recording, three factors are 
crucial here: technological advances, developments in the music industries 
and the state of the economy more generally. Firstly, technological advances 
in the 1920s saw the increasing use of both records and radio and the former 
were used by entrepreneurs like Carwardine to help generate profits for 
other businesses, such as restaurants, cafes, theatres and fairgrounds (Laing 
2004: 76). Secondly, the record companies looked with considerable envy at 
the initial success of the music publishers in establishing a collection agency, 
the Performing Right Society (PRS). This was formed in 1914 to collect a 
performing right on their behalf and had seen its revenue grow from £40,00 
in its first year to £346,000 in 1935 (Ehrlich 1989: 160). Finally, the economic 
downturn of the late 1920s had a severe impact on both the record companies 
and working musicians. In the two years prior to merging in 1931, the 
turnover of Columbia and The Gramophone Company (they merged to form 
Electrical and Musical Industries, EMI) had dropped by 90% (Gronow and 
Saunio 1998: 57). Prospects for working musicians were similarly dire. A 
post-war employment boom, particularly in cinemas, had seen membership 
of the Musicians’ Union reach 20,000 in 1925,14 but the advent of the “talkies” 
(sound film, the first of which, The Jazz Singer, came out in 1927) had shrunk 
employment in the cinemas, meaning that by 1934, the Union had fewer than 
7,000 members (Jempson 1993: 7).
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While McFarlane notes that in these adverse economic conditions, the 
record companies had been “casting around anxiously for an additional form of 
income to bolster their sagging profits” (1980: 132), the initial formulation of 
PPL suggests that this was something more complex than just an opportunist 
rights grab on behalf of the record companies.
PPL faced a number of initial problems. It was a small operation and was 
insufficiently resourced to effectively police all the uses of recorded music in 
the UK. In addition, those who contributed to the records—the composers 
and musicians who played on them—were unhappy that the funds raised went 
to the record companies and not to them. This meant that PPL had to quickly 
reach agreements to placate both groups. 
The PPL turned initially to the MU (as the largest organized group of 
musicians in the UK) and other unions representing performers,15 offering a 
share of its new-found income,16 and proposed that it would set aside, on an 
ex gratia17 basis, 20% of its net revenue for all the musicians who had appeared 
on recordings. After initial discussions, PPL decided that it would distribute 
the money directly to the musicians in question without the involvement of 
the MU, but a dialogue between the two organizations had begun, with PPL 
acknowledging the MU’s argument that the public performance of records 
could impact live music.
(c) PPL and the Musicians’ Union
While the Union had tacitly approved the existence of PPL on the basis that 
it might provide some additional income for a small number of its members, 
it was not until after World War II that an agreement was formally reached 
between the two parties. This was to remain in place for the next 43 years. 
In 1946, the Union found itself in a stronger negotiating position than in 
1935, with membership increasing as musicians returned from war and the 
demand for live music growing. However, it is also important to understand 
the Union’s broader stance on recorded music as detailed in its Report of the 
1945 Delegate Conference proceedings. Here it set out to:
(iii)	 Limit the extent to which gramophone records may be used for public 
entertainment;
(iv)	 Obtain payments to the Union from the users of any records repro-
duced publicly either directly or from radio broadcasting and
(v)	 Acquire some measure of control over the issuing of licences, and the 
conditions upon which licences are issued by PPL, for the use of record-
ings for public entertainment. (1947: 33)
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Clearly, the MU still saw recording as a threat to live performance, and 
where public performance of records was to be permitted, the Union wanted 
both control over the use of records and payment for that use.18 Broadcasting 
had become an increasingly important source of revenue for PPL, so this meant 
that, as well as negotiating with the MU in 1946, PPL also began negotiations 
with the BBC.19 Consequently, fear on the part of the record companies of a 
recording strike and a challenge to PPL’s collection arrangements meant that 
they were willing participants in post-war discussions with the MU, and, by 
extension, the BBC.
The power of the MU was evident in the outcome of the two sets of 
negotiations. In 1946, PPL agreed to pay the Union 10% of its net distributable 
revenues for the first two years and 12.5% thereafter to compensate non-
featured musicians on recordings, with a further 20% allocated for the featured 
performers.20  The Union was also able to exert sufficient influence over PPL’s 
eventual agreement with the BBC in 1947 to indirectly control the broadcast 
use of records. This agreement established the principle of “needletime,” a 
restriction on the number of hours of recorded music that could be played 
each week. The assumption was that remaining time would be filled with live 
musical performance. Needletime was initially set at 28 hours per week across 
the BBC radio networks, and though the allocation varied, this restriction 
remained in place until 1988.
The combined effect of these two agreements meant that the Union 
had achieved all three of the aims set out at the 1945 Delegate Conference, 
earning in the process a considerable degree of control over, and income from, 
the uses of recorded music in the UK.21 The extent of the MU’s influence over 
PPL extended beyond broadcasting to public performances of records, with 
venues around the country subject to a series of restrictions forcing them to 
guarantee musicians employment in return for being granted PPL licences 
which, in return, allowed them the right to play a limited number of records.22
(d) Lobbying for Performers’ Rights
The third area in which the MU has played a major part in the development 
of copyright in sound recordings in the UK has been in the formal recognition 
of the performer in UK law. While some limited rights for performers were 
granted in the Dramatic and Musical Performers’ Protection Act (1925), 
which made it an offence to make a recording “without the consent in writing 
of the performer or to sell, or perform in public any record made without such 
consent” (qtd. in Board of Trade 1952: 61), these were regarded as outdated 
and unworkable by 1952, when the Report of the Copyright Committee 
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acknowledged that, in practice, the refusal of consent by one player “was never 
likely to happen” (61).
With new copyright legislation being planned, the MU lobbied 
Members of Parliament between 1952 and 1956 on two main issues. The first 
was to advance the case for a performers’ right that enshrined in law the right 
of performers to be paid for public performances of records on which they 
played, and the second was to protect the 1946 agreement with PPL, the 
loss of which, General Secretary Hardie Ratcliffe told the Union’s executive 
committee, “would be a most disastrous occurrence” (minutes of Executive 
Committee meeting, July 3 and 4, 1955).
While the Copyright Act (1956) did not go this far, it was still a less 
than satisfactory outcome for both the Union and PPL. It rejected additional 
rights for performers, and established a Performing Right Tribunal to rule 
on disputes between users of recorded music and PPL. Understandably, 
both the MU and PPL were worried that this would reduce their shared 
control over the uses of recorded music, but it did not challenge the 
agreement between them, and actually strengthened PPL’s position in law 
with regards to the collection of revenues from both public performance 
and broadcasting.
Nevertheless, it took until 1996 before performers’ rights were fully 
recognized in UK law with the implementation of the EC Rental and Lending 
Rights Directive in the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations (1996).23 
The Performing Right Tribunal (later the Copyright Tribunal) ruled on a 
number of issues that affected PPL and the Union24, including, most notably, 
the case of the Association of Independent Radio Contractors (AIRC) in 
1980,25 but did not, in any of its findings, overtly challenge the nature of the 
agreement between them.
(e) Monopolies and Mergers Commission
Ultimately, it was another government body, the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC) that terminated the MU/PPL agreement of 1946, 
when the findings of its investigation into Collective Licensing (1988) were 
implemented by the Conservative government the following year.26 Much 
to the Union’s chagrin, and though the report specifically “did not criticize” 
(MMC 1988:38) the MU’s previous use of the funds, it proposed that “all 
performers should receive equitable remuneration, directly paid by PPL, 
specific to each recording’s use in broadcasting or public performance” 
(39). In other words, the MU could no longer retain the funds for collective 
use, nor would it handle the distribution of funds to individual members. 
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Unsurprisingly, the impact on the MU was colossal. The continued expansion 
of the recording industry meant that by 1987, the annual payment from 
PPL to the Union was £1.3 million (MU Executive Committee Report to 
Conference 1989); losing this income would have a significant impact on the 
Union and its members. 
Indeed, a further outcome of the MMC ruling was a lengthy dispute 
between the MU and PPL over what to do with the monies generated in the 
period post-1989. The MU argued to the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) that, contrary to the findings of the report, the Union was best placed 
to allocate these funds. This may have been an argument that they were 
to regret winning, given the ramifications, which are detailed in the next 
section.
(f) Copyright Term Extension on Sound Recordings
The final instance where copyright in sound recordings was changed with the 
support of both the MU and PPL is perhaps the most significant: the extension 
of the copyright term from fifty to seventy years, which was passed into UK 
law on November 1, 2013—the result of an extended campaign by music 
industries’ organizations, both collectively under the umbrella of UK Music27 
and individually. Tellingly, the momentum for this may have stemmed, again, 
from economic necessity on the part of the record companies.28 In a press 
release marking the extension, the Union’s General Secretary, John Smith, 
highlighted the Union’s leading role in the campaign and claimed that the 
extension “represents a major step forwards that will be welcomed by all 
recording musicians.”29
Rather than debating the merits or motivations behind such an 
extension, the extension of copyright is included here to illustrate that, since 
1934, the Union and PPL were largely in agreement when it came to each of 
the five sizeable changes in the operation of UK copyright law detailed above. 
However, the internal dynamics of the MU during the same period were often 
volatile, resulting primarily from the various demands of different types of 
musicians and the Union’s attempts to represent all its members, regardless of 
their employment status, musical proficiency or the style of music they played. 
This volatility was most visible at the start and end of the Union’s agreement 
with PPL, as shown in the next section’s examination of the issues that arose 
within the Union on receipt of, and the discontinuation of, the funds from 
PPL. 
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Part	3:	Internal	Conflict	
When the Union received its first payment in respect of the 1946 agreement with 
PPL, in 1951 (a sum of around £15 000 was paid towards outstanding sums in 
1951), there was much internal debate among members about how best to use it. 
This was further complicated by a string of conditions (discussed below) attached 
to the payments by PPL. At the outset, the Union’s Executive Committee decided 
that rather than distributing these monies directly to the musicians who actually 
played on the recordings, it would retain the funds and use them “for the benefit 
of all musicians” (Martin 1996: 16). The Union’s thinking here was clearly that the 
minority of members who were recording had a negative impact on the majority 
whose income derived primarily from live performance.
Two main considerations shaped the Union’s final allocation of the 
funds. The first was a fear of being perceived as a “yellow” union “in which it 
could be alleged that it was dependent in any way, either directly or indirectly, 
on employers’ organizations to maintain it in existence” (The Musician, January 
1961: 6). The second was the detail of the restrictions imposed by PPL. The 
most important of these was that the funds could not be used for “the purposes 
of furthering any trade dispute or for any purpose that may be contrary to or 
adversely affect the interests of PPL or its member companies” (Executive 
Committee Report to Conference 1947: 23). PPL also limited the amount of 
the income that could be used for general union administration costs to 5%, 
although this was later increased to 10%.
This meant that the Union’s eventual use of the PPL money was subject 
to both internal (what members wanted and how it would be perceived) and 
external (what PPL would allow and the fear of legislation) pressure. In response 
to this, the Union established a Special Account for what became known as the 
“Phonographic Funds.” For some years, this was unused, collecting interest 
until the tax implications were clarified and agreement reached on a plan for 
its use. When this finally happened, initial beneficiaries included the Union’s 
Benevolent Fund,30 a series of May Day Dances around the country, the Royal 
Philharmonic Orchestra, The Scottish Opera Society and the Bournemouth 
Military Band. However, in 1959, the Union’s Executive Committee made a 
tactical decision that “a large proportion of the Phonographic Funds should 
be utilized in the direct promotion of employment for members,” (Executive 
Committee Report to Conference 1959: 16). Influenced by the American 
Federation of Musician’s (AFM) experience,31 the emphasis was on live 
performance and employment.
In 1964, the Union advertised for an official to run what was then 
known as the “Keep Music Live” campaign, a post that was held until the 
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1990s by Brian Blain. During this period, the Union’s Music Promotion 
Committee (MPC), which oversaw the campaign, made numerous small 
grants to fund events, ensembles and organizations around the country, 
but also gave substantial amounts in both grants and loans to the London 
Symphony Orchestra, the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra and Ronnie Scott’s 
Jazz Club, all of which, at various points, were under threat of closure. All of 
this entrenched the MPC as an important part of the Union’s business for over 
three decades. While it clearly benefited the Union in public relations’ terms, 
the work of the MPC was also a cause of some subsequent problems, which 
centred on the Union’s relationship with both the recording industry and its 
members. The relationship with the recording industry had been formalized 
as a result of the PPL agreement, and central to the successful implementation 
of this agreement were the ex-gratia nature of the payments and the American 
experience. Gaining a voluntary agreement to pay the musicians collectively 
was a triumph for the MU: the loss of these funds would have played badly 
with members and would have had a negative financial impact on the Union. 
The longer the agreement held, and the larger the annual payments and 
reserves became, the more important these monies became for the Union. 
Similarly, for the record companies, the agreement with the Union was a way 
of reducing the threat of a recording ban, which, as the recording industry 
grew in size, could have been disastrous.
The stability of the agreement was continually threatened by 
legislation, technology, social change and general economic conditions; 
however, by voluntarily hitching their fortunes to each other, the MU and 
PPL maintained cordial industrial relations in the UK recording industry. 
By the late 1960s, when faced with new challenges to their agreement (for 
example, commercial television and the advent of, first, pirate radio and 
then independent radio32), both parties simply had too much to lose from a 
breakdown in the agreement. 
The other issue was what the PPL funds meant to the internal organization 
of the Union. In directing funds towards organizations where large numbers of 
its members worked (for example, the London Symphony Orchestra or Royal 
Philharmonic Orchestra), the Union at various points saved jobs and achieved 
what Blain claims was “a good public relations job for the Union, making the 
members more sympathetic to what the Union was about” (interview with 
Martin Cloonan, December 18, 2012). While there were inevitable disputes 
as to who were the most worthy recipients, there was little evidence of any 
substantial dissent among Union members and officials about the collective 
ethos behind the use of the PPL money, either at conferences or in the MU’s 
publications. 
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Remarkably, and in spite of the MU and PPL agreement being described 
in the House of Lords by Lord Burden in 1953 as “a travesty of trade unionism,” 
“a legalized racket” and “syndicalism of the most vicious kind” (qtd. in McFarlane 
1980: 115), it was not until the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 that the 
status quo was seriously threatened by a combination of a changing political 
climate and the growing power of the independent radio companies. 
Thatcher’s Conservative government introduced a range of legislation 
with the aim of curbing trade union powers, primarily with respect to the 
right to strike and “closed shop” arrangements.33 While the MU had only 
conducted localized strikes (most notably, a nine-week strike at the BBC in 
1980) and denied the existence of a “closed shop,”34 it felt the effects of the 
government’s reforms and what McIlroy called the government’s “reinjection 
of marketization into state owned enterprise and the rooting out of restrictive 
practices” (1995: 76). 
The deals struck in the 1970s between PPL, the MU and the AIRC 
were those that came under closest scrutiny as the independent radio stations 
struggled to become profitable in their early years, laying the blame for their 
lack of profitability partly on the high tariffs on advertising revenue and 
“needletime” restrictions imposed upon them.35 Having failed in their attempt 
to challenge these at the Performing Right Tribunal in 1980, the AIRC began an 
appeal and continued to lobby a receptive government ever more ferociously 
(see Stoller 2010) before finally achieving a reduced tariff and the abolition 
of “needletime” through a combination of the implementation of the MMC 
report, the Broadcasting Act of 1990 and a subsequent Copyright Tribunal 
ruling in 1992.
The outcome of the changes on the Union, as the General Secretary, 
Dennis Scard, noted, was that “the Union’s controls over ‘needletime,’ 
employment quotas and the policy of not allowing records to accompany live 
performance all disappeared overnight” (speech to MU Delegate Conference 
1991). Unsurprisingly, given the sudden and dramatic loss of control over, 
and revenue from, the recording industry, the Union underwent a period of 
conflict both with external bodies (PPL and the Department of Trade and 
Industry) and, more damagingly, internally. After finally resolving its dispute 
with PPL in 1994, the Union was left with large sums of money, covering the 
PPL revenue from 1989-1994, which it was left to distribute among those 
individual members who had played on the tracks that generated the revenue. 
This served to fuel internal dissent in two ways: first, in disputed individual 
claims on the funds and second, in wider discussions of the how the PPL 
monies had been handled historically by the Union.
Although nearly £12 million was distributed in the 1994-1996 period 
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(Martin 1996: 17)36 the Union had to allocate funds relating to recordings 
for which no or few records of the recording sessions were kept. Somewhat 
inevitably, multiple claims were made by musicians who claimed to have 
performed the same parts on some of the most popular records of the 1960s 
and 1970s, and distributions were made on the basis of a combination of a 
limited quantity of accurate data, unsubstantiated claims by musicians and, 
seemingly, guesswork. This inevitably caused some discord within parts of the 
membership. An unintended consequence of the Union’s distribution of these 
funds to individuals rather than using them collectively was that not only did it 
end the Union’s control over public performance and broadcasts of recorded 
music, but it also changed its relationship with its own membership.  
This internal discord was exemplified by a number of legal challenges 
brought by members against the Union (both in the courts and to the Trade Union 
Certification Officer) and, ultimately, in a challenge to the Union’s leadership. 
The most visible example of the former was the case of the session trumpet 
player Freddie Staff, who pursued a case against the Union, demanding access 
to the Union’s financial records. While this was eventually resolved when Staff 
was given access to the records in 2002, and while no claim was subsequently 
pursued, the case generated a considerable amount of bad press for the Union 
(see Lebrecht 2001; Sweeting 2001), some of which implied mismanagement 
on the part of the Union’s leadership over the Union’s use of the pre-1989 
PPL funds. The Union’s leadership fiercely rejected the notion that there had 
been anything underhanded in its management of these payments, and there is 
no evidence to suggest that there was. However, at least a sizeable minority of 
its members remained suspicious of the Union leadership’s financial decisions. 
As a direct result, incumbent General Secretary Dennis Scard was defeated in 
2000 after his opponent, Derek Kay, claimed in his election material that “the 
Union, otherwise bankrupt, is being sustained by appropriating money given 
to compensate for the loss of work” (2000).37  
Part 4: Findings—Changes in Musical Labour 
Today, the Union receives no funds from PPL, and session musicians are paid 
their share of monies due from their performances on records directly by PPL 
in a manner not dissimilar to that envisaged back in 1935. However, the story 
of the Union’s involvement in this revenue stream and the acceptance of the 
idea of remunerating performers for the public or broadcast use of recordings 
is worth placing in the wider context of changes in both the nature of musical 
employment and wider political issues. 
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While this article has viewed the end of the MU’s arrangement with 
PPL as being primarily a consequence of state intervention in what the 
government saw as the Union’s implementation of restrictive practices and 
a more general weakening of trade union power, the response to the end 
of such practices highlighted changes in both the employment status and 
worldview of the musical workforce in the intervening years. In 1946, very 
few musicians were involved in recording, and the majority of musical work 
was in live performances either in orchestras or dance bands. Although the 
record companies were seen as a potential threat to employment (in live 
music), they were not viewed by the Union as an employer in the same way as, 
for example, The Theatre Managers’ Association, Mecca Ballrooms or other 
major employers of musicians at the time. 
By 1989, the growth of the recording industry was one of a number 
of factors that meant an already fragmented musical workforce had become 
increasingly dependent on freelance work from a range of different employers. 
With a relatively small proportion of members in salaried employment (mainly 
in orchestras), Mark Melton, an employee of the MU at the time, claimed 
that “politically, the natural instincts of the self-employed are entrepreneurial” 
(interview with author, December 19, 2012). While this is a contestable claim, 
subsequent events suggest that, at least in the MU, some members happily 
embraced the neoliberal ideology underpinning the Thatcher government 
that McIlroy characterized as “a return to human nature, individualism and 
entrepreneurialism” (1995: 76). 
The move away from the collectivist philosophy that informed the 
Union’s original policy on the monies received from PPL was particularly 
evident in the number of individual members willing to attack the Union’s 
leadership (and by extension, underlying beliefs) during the course of the 
1990s.  The Union laid the blame for these developments at the door of not 
only the government but also what Scard called “ambulance-chasing” lawyers 
(speech to MU Delegate Conference, 1997) who, emboldened by new anti-
Trade Union legislation, encouraged disenfranchised members to create 
difficulties within their own union for potential personal enrichment.
Having succeeded, in partnership with the recording industry, in 
creating and sustaining an important revenue stream from the use of musical 
performance on recordings, the Union then found itself in an unenviable 
position in the early nineties: not only had a revenue source dried up, but 
many of the values that had been enshrined by its leadership were also being 
called into question by a number of its members.
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Conclusions
This account of the history of copyright in sound recordings in the UK has 
taken a different starting point from previous studies of the field. Rather than 
concentrating on, for example, the implications of copyright for composers, 
publishers, record companies or stars, it focused on the role of working 
musicians and their representative body, The Musicians’ Union. In doing so, 
it has highlighted three issues of importance beyond the UK and its specific 
examples, but which are all related to organized musical labour.
The first issue of note is the historic power of the MU during large parts 
of the 20th century. The combination of this power, together with the BBC’s 
initial monopoly in broadcasting38, meant that the Union was able to secure 
hugely advantageous deals with the record companies and broadcasters: it was 
a direct beneficiary of, and stakeholder in, some of the copyright legislation 
(and related practices) in the UK for most of the 20th century.
The second issue of note is the relationship between the Union and 
the record companies, which was not the typical, adversarial relationship 
between a trade union and one of the key employers in its industrial sector 
during the 20th century, but rather one based on shared interests and lobbying. 
John Morton spoke of the Union’s relationship with the recording industry as 
“generally very, very good” (interview with Dave Laing, April 5, 2011) and 
there is evidence of cooperation between the recording industry and Union 
on a range of issues including opposing the formation of the Performing Right 
Tribunal in the 1950s, supporting a blank tape levy in the 1980s and the 
extension of the copyright term in sound recordings in recent years. The MU 
remains involved with PPL despite the end of the financial link: it currently 
has two members on PPL’s Performer Board39 and both organizations are 
members of UK Music. 
These relations can also be viewed within wider changes in the Trade 
Union movement. Under the leadership of John Monks, the Trades’ Union 
Congress moved towards a more conciliatory approach under the banner 
of “new unionism,” a situation McIlroy described as one where “industrial 
relations and trade unions were no longer adversarial” (2009: 50). It could 
be argued that the MU’s experience of partnership and cooperation with the 
record companies pre-dated this approach by almost half a century. 
Finally, it is worth noting the changing nature of the Union itself. 
Faced with changes across the music industries, including a fragmented and 
largely freelance workforce with many different employers, the collectivism 
that served the Union so well from the 1940s, with its “for the benefit of all 
musicians” ethos, has been gradually eroded.  Bacon and Storey see this as 
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part of a general shift in UK unions, which came to rely “less on the collective 
context for Union activity and more on services that can be provided to 
individual members” (1996: 56).40
By focusing on providing services such as low-cost instrument and 
public liability insurance and campaigning on issues of broad agreement across 
the wider music industries, the MU has maintained its membership levels 
when other craft unions in the UK have been forced to merge with larger 
unions.41 That the MU remains influential in debates surrounding copyright is, 
therefore, as much to do with contemporary pragmatism as it is with historic 
collectivism.  
Notes
 1. For the purposes of this article, I will refer to the “music industries” (plural) 
of which recording, publishing and live music are the major components, as per 
Williamson and Cloonan (2007).
2. See http://www.muhistory.com. The author is a researcher on the project 
that as been funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).
3. Located at the University of Stirling. See: http://libguides.stir.ac.uk/ar-
chives.
4. The rights for which the Union has campaigned have generally been in the 
interests of session musicians and orchestral players. 
5. At various points, radio and, to a lesser extent, television, were seen as a 
threat to both sales of recorded music (by record companies) and work in live music 
(by the Union). 
6. For the purposes of this article, I will refer to the “recording industry” as 
one of the component parts of the wider “music industries” as per Williamson and 
Cloonan (2007).
7. See, for example, the Annual Reports of Live Nation (2013) and Vivendi 
(2013).
8. The major record companies in the UK formed PPL in 1934 to collect royal-
ties (on the recordings) for public performance.
9. This was approved by the EU in September 2011 and became law in the UK 
on November 1, 2013.
10. The AMU was the forerunner of the Musicians’ Union, founded in 1893.
11. Most were deemed variety artists and members of the Variety Artists’ 
Federation.
12. Gramophone Co. v. Carwardine (1934, Ch. 450).
13. EMI and Decca dominated the British recording market in the 1930s (see 
Gronow and Saunio 1998: 58).
14 The AMU had merged with the National Orchestral Union of Professional 
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Musicians to form the Musicians’ Union in 1921.
15. The actors’ union, Equity and the Variety Artists’ Federation (VAF).
16. A separate deal was reached with the music publishers via their collection 
society, MCPS (Mechanical Copyright Protection Society).
17. This is a legal term meaning “by favour”— in this case, that the record com-
panies made the payments voluntarily and were under no legal obligation to do so.
18. An important international precedent had been set here on the conclu-
sion of the 1942-44 recording strike by the American Federation of Musicians. This 
was resolved by the record companies agreeing to make payments into the AFM’s 
Transcription and Recording Fund for unemployed musicians (see Pinta 2010: 29).
19.  The British Broadcasting Company was formed in 1922, and became the 
British Broadcasting Corporation in 1926, having been granted a Royal Charter. This 
gave it a monopoly over radio and TV broadcasting in the UK until Independent 
Television (ITV) launched in 1955.
20. This was not distributed by the MU but by the record companies to whom 
the featured artists were signed.
21. The first payment from PPL to the MU was in 1951, and was placed in a 
Special Fund before the Union decided how to use it. 
22. The “misuse of records” was a frequent agenda item in the Union’s execu-
tive’s minutes during the 1950s.
23. Though they had been recognized in the Rome Convention of 1961 to 
which the UK was a signatory, it was at the behest of the individual governments 
to initiate legislation to recognize the right of performers to income from public 
performances of works on which they had played. In the UK, this legislation came 
about as a result of the European Union (EU)’s attempts to harmonize copyright 
laws across member states. 
24. For the full remit of the Copyright Tribunal see http://www.ipo.gov.uk/
ctribunal.htm. 
25. The AIRC was the trade body of independent local radio, which began in 
the UK in 1973. Its members were unhappy at the high percentage of advertis-
ing revenue that PPL (at the MU’s prompting) charged and the limited amount of 
“needletime” offered (see Stoller 2010: 181-196).
26. The government sought voluntary undertakings from PPL and MU to 
implement the findings without it having to resort to legislation.
27. A UK music industries’ lobbying organisation whose members include rep-
resentatives of record companies (British Phonographic Industry (BPI), Association 
of Independent Music (AIM), PPL), publishers (Music Publishers’ Association 
(MPA), Performing Right Society (PRS) and musicians (MU), as well as concert 
promoters and music education bodies. 
28. According to International Federation of Phonographic Industries statistics, 
retail sales of recorded music dropped every year from 1999-2011 (IFPI 2012).
29. See http://www.musiciansunion.org.uk/news/2011/09/14/victory-for-
term-extension-campaign/ (accessed November 12, 2013).
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30. The Union’s Benevolent Fund offered support to the families of musicians 
and their families in times of financial hardship caused by illness and inability to 
work. 
31. After the 1947 US musicians’ strike, the AFM set up a Music Performance 
Trust with an independent trustee (Pinta 2010: 29) with the emphasis on creating 
employment in live performance for unemployed musicians. 
32. Commercial television in the UK launched in 1955, pirate radio was broad-
cast from ships off the coast of the UK during the mid-sixties to flout broadcasting 
regulations, and Independent Local Radio (ILR), which was funded by advertising, 
launched in 1973.
33. The “closed shop” was an arrangement wherein all workers in a certain loca-
tion or trade had to be Union members.
34. John Morton, the General Secretary, denied the MU operated a “closed 
shop” but said “it depends what you mean by closed shop. In reality, everyone in this 
country seriously involved in making money from music—or seriously involved in 
music and requiring to earn money from it—will be a member of the MU” (inter-
view, September 1985 available from British Library).
35. The ILR stations had to pay 3% of their net advertising revenues in the first 
year (rising to 7%) to PPL, while the MU extracted a commitment from them to 
spend a further 3% of advertising revenue on live music. The stations were limited 
to 9 hours of “needletime” per day (Stoller 2010: 186).
36. In 1996, two new collection agencies, PAMRA (Performing Arts Media 
Rights Association) and AURA (Association of United Recording Artists) were set 
up to distribute the funds from PPL. The MU was represented at board level on 
PAMRA.
37.After his election, the Executive Committee suspended Kay for bringing the 
Union into disrepute for these and other comments during his campaign.
38. As a public service broadcaster, the BBC had no meaningful competition in 
television until 1973 and radio until 1955 on the launch of Independent Television 
(ITV) and Independent Local Radio (ILR) respectively 
39. John Smith and Pete Thoms represent the Union. 
40. See Cloonan (this issue) for discussion of the shift in the role of the British 
Musicians’ Union toward providing member services more so than negotiating with 
employers.
41. Membership of the MU in 2012 was 31,482, around the same as it was in 1968.
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